Everything that must be true before a supplier can be paid — and the one field fraudsters target.
Vendor onboarding is the process of collecting, verifying and recording the information needed to transact with a supplier: legal identity, tax registration, bank details, compliance documents and contact data. It is a financial control, because the vendor master determines where money goes.
The vendor master is where payment fraud happens. A changed bank account on an otherwise legitimate supplier record diverts every subsequent payment, and the invoices look entirely normal because they are normal. Onboarding and change controls on that one field prevent more loss than most other finance controls combined.
Supplier submits legal name, registration, tax details, bank data and compliance documents — ideally through a portal rather than email.
Registration and tax status checked against official sources. Bank details confirmed by calling a number held on file, not one supplied with the change.
Against name, registration number and bank account before the record is created. Duplicates fragment spend and enable double payment.
By someone other than the requester, with the evidence attached to the record.
Bank-detail changes treated as a new verification, not an edit. Change-logged, re-verified and re-approved every time.
An email arrives from a known supplier's usual contact address, advising new bank details for future payments. The email is well written, references a real open invoice, and the signature block is correct. Accounts updates the master record. Two payments totalling 34 lakh go to the new account before the real supplier calls about non-payment.
This is among the most common and most effective frauds in business, and it does not require sophistication — only a compromised mailbox or a convincing lookalike domain. The money is rarely recovered, because it is moved within hours.
The control is procedural and cheap: bank detail changes are never actioned from an email instruction. They require verification by telephone to a number held on file from before the request, not a number in the email, performed by someone other than the person who received the request, with the change logged and approved separately. Any business paying suppliers should treat this as mandatory rather than prudent.
| Term | What it means |
|---|---|
| Due diligence | Verifying the supplier is real, solvent, compliant and capable. |
| Bank verification | Independently confirming bank details, which is the key fraud control. |
| Compliance documents | Tax registration, statutory certificates, insurance, sector licences. |
| Approved vendor list | The set of suppliers cleared to receive orders. |
| Periodic re-verification | Rechecking details and documents, because they expire and change. |
The fraudster supplies the number you ring. Use contact details already held on the record.
Attachments in email are easy to forge and impossible to audit. A portal gives a trail.
Separation of duties on the vendor master is the control. Without it, there is none.
Dormant and duplicate vendor records accumulate and are what gets exploited.
| Metric | What it tells you | What distorts it |
|---|---|---|
| Onboarding cycle time | How long from request to approved vendor. Slow onboarding drives maverick spend. | |
| Bank detail changes by verification method | Should be 100 percent independently verified. Anything less is exposure. | |
| Expired compliance documents | Suppliers whose certificates have lapsed, which is a live risk nobody is watching. | |
| Duplicate vendor records | The same supplier onboarded twice, which breaks spend analysis and enables duplicate payment. |
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