The reason well-built systems get rejected — and what can be done about it before go-live rather than after.
Change management in an ERP programme is the work of getting people to use the system as designed: involving them in design, communicating what changes and why, training on their actual processes, and supporting them through the first months. It is the difference between a system that works and a system that is used.
ERP failures are rarely technical. The system does what it was configured to do; people continue using spreadsheets alongside it, enter data late, or work around controls they do not understand. Every one of those is a change-management failure, and each is far cheaper to prevent before go-live than to correct afterwards.
The people doing the work know the exceptions. Excluding them guarantees a design that cannot handle real cases.
A control that seems like bureaucracy gets circumvented. The same control, explained, usually gets accepted.
Train on the scenarios people actually face, with their data, not on a tour of the menu.
One capable person per team answers more questions than a central helpdesk and is trusted more.
Transactions entered on time, workarounds observed, support tickets by theme. Adoption is measurable.
Six months after go-live, a department is still maintaining the spreadsheet the ERP was meant to replace. The project team treats this as resistance and escalates.
Asking why produces a specific answer. The spreadsheet carries a column the ERP does not have — an informal priority flag the team uses to sequence work. Nobody mentioned it during discovery because nobody thought of it as data; it was just something they did. Without it, the ERP cannot support their actual workflow, so they use the ERP for the official record and the spreadsheet for the real one.
The fix is a custom field and a sort order, which is perhaps a day of work. The broader lesson is that shadow processes are diagnostic rather than defiant: they mark exactly the places where the system does not fit the work. A change programme that treats them as compliance failures loses the information. One that treats each as a question — what does this do that we do not — usually finds a small gap and closes it.
| Term | What it means |
|---|---|
| Sponsor | The senior leader accountable for the change actually happening, not merely supportive of it. |
| Super-user | A respected colleague in each department who learns the system deeply and helps others. |
| Resistance | Opposition to the change. Usually rational, and usually information about something real. |
| Adoption | Actual use of the new way of working, as distinct from the system being available. |
| Shadow process | Spreadsheets and workarounds that survive alongside the new system. |
A system presented as finished invites resistance from people who were never asked.
Training too early is forgotten; too late is rushed. Close to go-live, then reinforced after.
A workaround means the system does not fit the work. Investigate it rather than prohibit it.
Go-live is the start of adoption, not the end of the project.
| Metric | What it tells you | What distorts it |
|---|---|---|
| Transaction volume by module | Whether the system is genuinely being used, by department. | |
| Shadow processes identified | Count them openly. A programme that finds none is not looking. | |
| Support tickets by category | Repeated questions indicate a training gap or a design problem, and the two need different responses. | |
| Super-user engagement | Whether departmental support is working or everything escalates to central IT. |
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